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WAR AND PRIVATE CONTRACTS

THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON PRIVATE CONTRACTS

Werner W. Schroeder*

T

HE destruction and impairment of contracts caused by governmental agencies because of the necessities of war production have
been more far-reaching than is generally realized. A report that one
large industrial organization has been prevented from performance of
contracts involving more than one hundred and fifty million dollars
gives a hint of the extent of these commercial casualties.
Here is a typical case: early in I 941 W company agreed to manufacture for and sell to D company, which agreed to buy and pay for,
a complicated machine to be specially manufactured. Delivery was to
take place in two years. In due course priorities were granted to the D
company and in turn extended to the W company. Work progressed
( although at times delayed by priorities'difficulties) until August, I 942,
when the War Production Board cancelled all priorities and prohibited
the D company from accepting delivery under the contract. D company immediately notified W company of those developments. By that
time W company had expended toward the manufacture of the machine
a sum equal to approximately half of the contract price. Nothing had
been delivered to D company.
Two principal questions arise from such events:
(a) What is the effect on the continued existence of a contract
which is made impossible or more difficult of performance by orders of
governmental agencies such as the WPB or OPA?
(b) Who bears the loss arising upon frustration of a contract
through governmental action?
Answer to the first question, applied to its many varying phases, has
been attempted in a multitude of cases. In both the First World War
and this one that inquiry has received considerable attention in England
and America.
The second question, applied to limited circumstances, definitely
has been answered in England by a reply, which, incidentally, has negatived a rule which had been in force there for four decades.
In the United States, a development of the law dealing with that
basic, and in some respects more important, inquiry is still in its rudimentary stages.
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I.
D-OCTRINE OF COMMERCIAL FRUSTRATION

.,

The pronouncement ·of the House of Lords in the Metropolitan
Water Board case, by reason of certain dramatic legal background, and
also because of its high authority, has become a prominent landmark in
the development of the doctrine of "commercial frustration."
In the month preceding the beginning of World War I, the Water
Board had entered into a contract with the respondents for the construction of a reservoir to be completed within six years. The contract was
supplemented the following May. A substantial amount of work had
been done by February 21, 1916, when work was stopped by the
Minister of Munitions and the plant of the respondent sold under his
dit:ection. The Water Board promptly commenced action, asking for a
declaration that the contract was still in existence and had not been
determined. The respondent's defense was predicated on the order· of
the Minister of Munitions.
Following Horlock's case 1 and distinguishing the facts from Tamplin's case,2 Lord Dunedin observed:
" ... Earl Loreburn points out that in all cases it must be said
that there is an implied term of the contract which ·excuses the
party; in the circumstances, from performing the contract, and then
continues ... : 'It is, in my opinion, the true principle, for no Court
has an absolving power, but it can infer from the nature of the contract and the surrounding circumstances that a condition which is
not expressed was a foundation on which the parties contracted.'
He further points out that the particular ratio decidendi in various
cases is sometimes that .performance has become impossible, and
that the party concerned did not promise to perform an impossibility; sometimes it is put that the parties contemplated a certain
state of things which fell out otherwise."
The same doctrine runs through the other opinions, Lord Atkinson
saymg:
"· .. The Executive Government, acting no doubt legally and
within its powers, has for objects of State made it illegal and impossible for the respondents to do that which they promised to do.
1 Horlock v. Beal, [1916] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 486, 85 L.J. (N.S.) (1 K.B.) 602, 114
L. T. R. 193, 32 T. L. R. 251 (1916).
2
Tamplin v. Petroleum Products Co., [1916] 2 A.C. (H.L.) 397, 85 L. J.
(N.S.) (2 K.B.) 1389, II5 L.T:R. 315, 32 T.L.R. 677 {1916).
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. No one can tell how long it may continue to be invaded. In my
opinion they are entitled to be absolved from the further performance of that promise."
· And Lord Parmoor saying:
cc' .•. The rule laid down in Brewster v. Kitchell ... rests upon
this ground, that it is not reasonable to suppose that the legislature,
while altering the condition of things with reference to which the
covenantor contracted, intended that he should remain liable on a
covenant which the legislature itself prevented his fulfilling'." 8
By unanimous vote the contract was held to have been terminated
by action of the governmental agency.
The doctrine, with many qualifications, exceptions and modifications, was not new to the English and American law.4 But the statement in the Metropolitan case represented an attempt to distill the rule
into purer philosophical form. 5
3
Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick, Kerr & Co., Ltd., [1918] A.C. (H.L.) 119
at 127, 135 and 141, 87 L.J. (N.S.) 370, 34 T.L.R. 113, 117 L.T.R. 766 (1917).
4
Marshall v. Glanville, [1917] 2 K.B. 87, 116 L.T.R. 560 (1917); Re Shipton,
[1915] 3 K.B. 676, 84 L.J. (N.S.) (2 K.B.) 2137, 113 L.T.R. 1009, 31 T.L.R.
598 (1915); Andrew Millar & Co. v. Taylor & Co., [1916] 1 K.B. 402, 85 L.J.
(N.S.) (1 K.B.) 346, 114 L.T.R. 216, 32 T.L.R. 161 (1916); Jager v. Tolme,
[1916] 1 K.B. 939, 85 L.J. (N.S.) (2 K.B.) 1116, 114 L.T.R. 647, 32 T.L.R. 291
(1916); Horlock's case, [1916] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 486; The Styria v. Malcolmson, 186
U.S. 1, 22 S. Ct. 731 (1901). See Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns. (N.Y.) 438
(1819) and The William Bagaley, 5 Wall. (72 U.S.) 377 (1866), dealing with destruction of executory contracts between citizens and persons who become alien enemies
because of war.
6
The rather abstract character of the rule is illustrated by the words of Lord
Wright in Fibrosa Spolka Akeyjna v. Fairbair,n. Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd., 167
L.T.R. (H.L.) 1-01 (1942) who, alluding to the reasoning of Lord Sumner in Hirji
Mulji v. Cheong Yue Steamship Co., 134 L.T.R. (P.C.) 737 (1926), said at p. 112.
" ••• He combines with this a reference to what has been generally accepted by
English law, that the rule is explained in theory as a condition or term of the contract
implied by the law ab initio. No one who reads the reported cases can ignore how
inveterate is this theory or explanation in English law. I do not see any objection to this
mode of expression, so long as it is understood that what is implied is what the court
thinks the parties ought to have agreed on the basis of what is fair and reasonable, not
what as individuals they would or might have agreed. 'It is,' said Lord Sumner,
'irrespective of the individuals concerned, their temperaments and failings, their interest and circumstances.' The court is thus taken to assume the role of the reasonable
man, and decides what the reasonable man would regard as just on the facts of the case.
The hypothetical 'reasonable man' is personified by the court itself. It is the court
which decides. The position is thus somewhat like the position in the cases in which the
court imports a term in a contract on the basis of what is reasonable."
Thus, the ordinary reasonable man-long pointed out to tort-feasors as the ideal
citizen-goes into "trade."
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The apparent clarity of their Lordships' statements in the Metropolitan ·case is, however, illusory. Its application to the ever-changing
facts of cases that arise will never leave it unburdened from difficult
questions of fact.
What is a "short and temporary stoppage" and what, as said in
Admiral Shipping Co. v. W eidner,6 is such an inordinate postponement .
of fulfillment that when the delay is over will not accomplish that
.which the parties to the contract must have known that each of them
had in mi!).d, will ever involve questions of fact that are bound to obscure the apparent lucidity of the implied condition philosophy.
However, that a state of war is such an event as to render "the performance of a contract indefinitely· impossible" seems to be settled by
the opinion of Lord Simon in the Fibrosa case,6· who, quoting Lush J ~
in Geipel v. Smith,7 says:
"'... a state of war' (in that case the Franco-German war of
870) 'must be presumed to be likely to continue so long and so to
disturb the commerce of merchants as to defeat and destroy the
object of a commercial adventure like.this'." 8
I

The Tennants case 9 decided a few months earlier than the Metropolitan Water case was even more extreme in its facts. There a seller
had agreed to deliver magnesium chloride; but with the 01,1tbreak of the
war the supply from Germany was cut off so that he was not able to
supply the buyer except by purchasing at a greatly increased price sufficient to satisfy the buyer's contract but in disregard of his other contracts. Here there was not an entire physical impossibility nor an
illegality in performance of the contract,· but an extreme economic condition. The contract, however, was held terminated, the· House of
Lords holding that the shortage of supply was such as to hinder delivery, but qualified its statement with the observation that a rise in
6

[1916] I K.B. 429.
L.R. 7 Q.B. 404 at 4.14 (1872).
8
Fibrosa Spolka Akeyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd., 167 L.T.R.
(H.L.) IOI at·102 (1942).
In The Stryia v. Malcolmson, 186 U.S. I at 14, 22 S. Ct. 731 (1901) the Court
said, quoting from the lower federal court:
' " 'When two nations formally proclaim tl1e existence of a state of war between
themselves with all the solemnity observed in this instance, it would seem to be going
too far to say that parties whose contrac~ are affected thereby should wait some indefinite time, which a court shall find reasonable, in a vague, expectation that the belligerents may think better of it and make peace.' "
9 Tennants (Lancashire), Ltd., v. C. S. Wilson and Co., Ltd;, [ I 917] A.C.
(H.L.) 495, 86 L.J. (N.S.) (2 K.B.) II91, II6 L.T.R. 780, 33 T.L.R. 454 (1917).
7
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price would not in itself constitute a frustration of the contract. This
case has some interest in connection with the effect of OPA pnce
regulations prese~tly to be mentioned.
The doctrine is not without limitations. That 'the governmental
acts make performance unprofitable or more difficult or expensive does
not constitute a frustration oj the contract.10
· Nor is the contract terminated if the parties appear to have contracted with reference to the existence of a state of war and have clearly
contemplated the risks arising from it.11
Nor if performance was due before the occurrence of the governmental action.12 Nor if non-performance is.due to the fault of one of
the parties rather than because of the governmental inhibition.18
A development of law in the United States during the first World
War was along parallel lines. North German Lloyd v. Guaranty
Trust Company 14 was a libel against a German ship which had contracted to carry kegs of gold from New Yark to Plymouth and Cherbourg. The shipment began July 27, 1914. In mid-ocean the master of
the ship was advised of the imminence of war, then proceeded to a point
from which his coal supply would carry him back to America, which
10

Metropolitan Water Board case, [1918] A.C. (H.L.) 119; Thomson v. Thomson, 315 Ill. 521, 146 N.E. 451 (1925); Commonwealth v. Bader, 271 Pa. 308, 114
A. 266 (1921); Commonwealth v. Neff, 271 Pa. 312, 114 A. 267 (1921); Columbus
lly., Light & Power Co. v. Columbus, 249 U.S. 399, 39 S. Ct. 349 (1919); Texas
Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619, 41 S. Ct. 612 (1920); London & Lancashire Ind. Co. v. County, 107 Ohio St. 51, 140 N.E. 672 (1923).
11
Smith v. Morse, 20 La. Ann. 220 at 222 (1868); Mederios v. Hill, 8 Bing
231, 131 Eng. Rep. 390 (1832); Bolckow, V. & Co. v. Compania Minera de Sierra
Minera, 115 L.T.R. (K.B.) 745, 33 T.L.R. 111 (1916); Primos Chemical Co. v.
Fulton Steel Corp., (D.C.N.Y. 1920) 266 F. 945; Krulewitch v. Natl. Imp. & Tr. Co.,
186 N.Y.S. 838 (1921); Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Am. Trading Co., 195 U.S. 439, 25
S. Ct. 84 (1904); Lithfl.ux M. & C. Works v. Jordan, 217 Ill. App. 64 (1920).
In late 1941 and early 1942, many contracts were written with a so-called "escalator clause," which provided for variations in the consideration to be·paid dependent
upon fluctuations in the price of the principal items entering into production, usually
steel and labor. If such contracts receive the consideration of the courts it will be
interesting to observe whether such clauses are held to have eliminated the implied
condition.
12 Produce Brokers v. Weiss & Co., II8 L.T.R. (K.B.) III, 87 L.J. -(N.S.)
(K. B.) 472 (1918), affirmed by Court of Appeal, see 145,L.T.J. 188 (1918); Salembier, L. & Co. v. North Adams Mfg. Co., 178 N.Y.S. 607 (1919).
18
Rader v. Northrup-Williams Co., (C.C.A. 4th, 1920) 269 F. 592; Neuberg v.
Payne Co., 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 366 (1942); Tabachnik v. Lamar S. F. Corp., (D.C.N.Y.
1942) 46 F. Supp. 699.
14 244 U.S. 12, 37 S. Ct. 490 (1916); see The San Guiseppe (C.C.A. 4th,
1941) 122 F. (2d) 579.
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was I ,070 miles. this side of Plymouth. He there turned back) although
war had not formally been declared. In denying recovery for the
breach of contract of carriage, the court ruled that· a ship owner may
· give up his voyage to avoid capture after war is declared, and so likewise is at liberty to anticipate war.
This was followed by Allanwilde Transport Corporation v. Vacuum
Oil Company,15 holding that a carrier was discharged from his obligation to perform a contract for carriage where first he had been turned
back by a storm and then had been inhibited by the refusal of the government to permit ships to enter the war zone. The right of a carrier
to retain pre-paid freight, while expressly bottomed on the terms of the
bill of lading, will become relevant to our second inquiry.16
Roxford Knitting Company v. Moore & Tierney 11 achieved the
same result, but based its reasoning upon the paramount power of the
government in time of war to appropriate private property and cut
through all contractual rights. Plaintiff had sued defendant for the
price of certain underwear delivered. Defendant had counter-claimed
that a contract between them provided for the delivery of greater
amounts than had been delivered and that the damage suffered by defendant by reason of non-delivery exceeded the amount claimed by the
plaintiff. The latter replied that the government had ordered it to turn
over its manufactured products to the Navy. Plaintiff was allowed to
recover for what had been delivered and defendant's counter-claim was
dep.ied because of the impossibility on plaintiff's part to perform after
the impact of governmental orders. The doubts that bedeviled the
'House of Lords in the Metropolitan Water case and caused it to
rationalize a basis for the termination of the contract do not seem to
have concerned the Circuit Court of Appeals, which based its decision
15

248 U.S. 377, 39 S. Ct. 147 (1919). See 3 A.L.R. 15, 21 (1919).
In Texas Co. v. Hogarth Shipping Co., 256 U.S. 619 at 629, 41 S. Ct. 612
(1920), in which a ship chartered for a certain voyage was requisitioned by the British
government, it was said: ·
"It lo~g has been settled in the English courts and in those of this country, federal
and state, that where parties enter into a contract on the assumption that some particular
thing essential to its performance
continue to exist and be available for the purpose
and neither agrees to be responsible (or its continued existence and availability, the contract must be regarded as subject to an implied condition that, if before the time for
performance and without the default of either party the particular thing ceases to exist
or be available for the purpose, the contract shall be dissolved and the parties excused
from performing it."
See The Styria v. Malcolmson 186 U.S. 1, 22 S .Ct. 731 (1901); Borup et al v.
Western Operating Corp., (C.C.A. 2d., 1942) 130 F. (2d) 381.
17 (C.C.A. 2d, 1920) 265 F. 177. See II A.L.R. 1415, 1429 (1921).
16

will
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on the right of the general government to cut through all private rights
for the protection of the public safety.
That basis possesses a satisfying directness and could perhaps be
urged as a foundation for all similar cases were we not embarrassed by
the statements in Mitchell v. Harmoney 18 and United States v. Russell,10 relied upon by that court, which hold that the government is
bound in all such cases to make full compensation to the owner. A pursuit of that philosophy would irresistibly inspire the claim that the
government is obligated to compensate a citizen whose property right
in a contract has been destroyed by the necessities of war.20
In Mawhinney v. Millbrook Woolen Mills, 21 the New York court
relied both on the Roxford case and the Metropolitan Water Board
case. There a purchaser sued a manufacturer for failure to deliver part
of an order of woolens in accordance with the terms of a written contract. When the contract had been partially performed, the government contracted for a large quantity of uniform cloth to be manufactured by the defendant. The National Defense Act made compliance
with military orders obligatory and gave them precedence over all
other orders and contracts. Recovery for breach of contract was denied.
The cases noticed up to this point are those in ,which a governmental
order or an event of war has made the contract physically impossible
of performance. Another situation arises in judging the effect of price
controls. There the governmental order does not prohibit the manufacture or delivery of the articles but prohibits their sale at more than
a specified price. If, before the promulgation of the order, a contract
has been entered into at a higher price, what is the effect on the contract? The courts might have argued that such an order does not_ render
the contract impossible of performance, but merely makes it more unprofitable or difficult, and have followed that exception to the general
rule. But the very few authorities so far available seem to indicate a
trend the other way, holding that, "The price at which the goods were
to be sold ... was as much an essence of the contract as any of its other
provisions." 22 Such orders have consequently been held to be a "complete frustration of performance," bringing an end to the contract.
18

13 How. (54 U.S.) u5 (1851).
13 Wall. (80 U.S.) 623 (1871).
20
That claim has been rejected in Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261
U.S. 502, 43 S. Ct. 437 (1923): "Frustration and appropriation are essentially different things."
21
'231 N.Y. 290, 132 N.E. 93 (1921). See 15 A.L.R. 1506, 1512 (1921).
22
Re Kramer v. Uchitelle, 288 N.Y. 467 at 472, 43 N.E. (2d) 493 (1942).
See 141 A.L.R. 1497, 1502 (1942).
10

I
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In the Ross Lumber case, which arose during the First vJorld
War, the price of lumber had been fixed by the government at a point
higher than the market price with reference to which the parties had
contracted. " ... a necessary term of a binding contract, thus, without the
fault of either of the parties, ceased to exist, and either party could refuse to be further bound by the terms." 28
The earlier federal case and the later New York cases reach the
same result and employ the same reasoning without apparent reference
to each other.
There is still another type of case in which the governmental order
does not directly affect the contract but impairs the use to which_ the
parties can put the fruits of the contract. Under this classificatioh ·are
leases of business property made for specific purposes. The rule seems
to be that if the governmental order has entirely destroyed the possi;bility of selling the products which were to be sold-on the leased
premises, a frustration of the contract has occurred and the lessee is
excused from further payments of rent.24 The same result followed
. when the tenant was drafted and so became unable to enjoy the benefits
of the lease.25
B~t if the governmental regulation does not entirely prohibit the
28
,
Ross Lumber Co. v. Hughes Lumber Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1920) 264 F. 757 at
760. See Sanders v. Lowenstein, 264 App. Div. 367, 35 N.Y.S. (2d) 591 (1942).
That the trend of these cases may be reversed is indicated by the implication of
the vigorous dissent of Lehman, J. in the Kramer case, and by such'cases as Freund v.
Zephyr Laundry Mac:1\ine Co., (N.Y. 1942) 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 250, in which the court
refused to find a salesman's contract impossible of performance despite government
orders and directives restricting and prohibiting the sale of articles which the salesman
had been employed to sell.
'
The Kramer case should be examined on the effect of frustration on the arbitration clause. Compare Heyman v. Darwin, I I I L.J. Rep. (K.B.) 241 (1942); Johnson
v. Atkins, (Cal. 1942) 127 P. (2d) 1027; Lipman v. Haeuser Shellac Co., 289
N.Y. 76, 43 N.E. (2d) 817 (1942), discussed in 43 CoL. L. REV. 508 (1943)
and 41 M1cH. L. REv. 995 (1943).
.
24
Canrock Realty Co. v. Vim Electric Co., 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 139 (1942); Schantz
v. American Auto Supply Co., 178 Misc. 909, 36 N.Y.S. (2d) 747 (1942); Signal
Land Corp. v. Loecher, 35 N.Y.S. (2d) 25 (1942).
1
Kaiser v. Zeigler, 187 N.Y,S. 638 (1921), reviews the lease situation arising from
the adoption of the prohibition amendment. The great weight of authority was found
to be that such an enactment destroys the subject matter of the contract, makes performance impossible and hence terminates the lease.
Chandler v. Webster, [1904] I K. B. 493, 90 L.T.R. 217 (1904) was overruled in the Fibrosa case on the point of who should bear the loss but approved in its
holding that the lease had been destroyed by failure of its. purpose ..
25
Jefferson Estates, Inc. v. Wilson, 35 N.Y.S. (2d) 582 (1942).
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business to be carried on in the leased premises but only limits or restricts it and thus makes the use less profitable, the lease is not brought
to an end.26
So if the lease provided that the premises were to be used for an
automobile showroom only, federal orders, restricting the purchase of
new automobiles to certain individuals but placing no restriction on the
sale of used cars, did not destroy the lease. "These are war times and
no one can expect to carry on business as usual." 27
•
In the lease cases the reasoning was based upon the proposition that
the parties are presumed to have contracted with a view to the law as
it existed at the time; that a change of law, making enjoyment of the
contract impossible, excuses both from performance.
So, the diminution of the retail sales of gasoline, because of the
orders of the Federal Petroleum Co-ordinator, did not of itself destroy
a lease.28 But it seems that if the defendant were able to show that the
diminution 'was in such volume as to defeat the beneficial enjoyment of
the lease, it could be held to be a frustratiQn. 29
The lease cases seem to indicate an inclination on the part of the
courts to apply the doctrine that impossibility has not occurred when
performance becomes less profitable or more difficult. But they appear
to recognize a line beyond which lack of profit can amount to complete
destruction of the contract.
The so-called "no damage statute" and the priorities regulations in
accordance with it dispose of the immediate question of damages for
breach such as arose in the Roxford and Mawhinney cases. The statute
is as follows:
"· .. No person, firm, or corporation shall be held liable for
damages or penalties for any default under any contract or purchase order which shall result directly or indirectly from his compliance with any rule, regulation, or order issued under this section." so
26

Byrnes v. Balcom, 265 App. Div. 268, 38 N.Y.S. (2d) 801 (1942); Colonial
Operating Corp. v. Hannon Sales and Service, Inc., 265 App. Div. 411, 39 N.Y.S.
(2d) 217 (1943).
27
Deibler v. Bernard Bros., 319 Ill. App. 504 at 506, 48 N.E. (2d) 422 (1943).
8
;
Knorr v. Jack and Al, Inc., 38 N.Y.S. (2d) 406 (1942).
29
Port Chester Central Corp. v. Leibert, 39 N.Y.S. (2d) 41 (1943).
so Section 2 (a) (2) of Pub. Act 671, 76th ·cong., (June 28, 1940), 54 Stat. L.
676, as amended by Pub. L. 89; 77th Cong., 2d sess. (May 31, 1941), 55 Stat. L. 236.
Suppose a contract having its locus in a state that denies the rule of the Metropolitan Water Board case, supra note 3: would this statute deprive the injured party of
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This statement of policy is repeated in Priorities Regulation Number r, which reads:
"· .• No person shall be held liable for damages or penalties
for any default under any contract or purchase order which shall
result directly or indirectly from his compliance with any rule,
regulation, or Order issued by the Director of Priorities/' 81
That statute and the regulations do not, however, dispose of the
contract nor answer the inquiry whether it continues in existence so that
either ·party may insist upon performance after relaxation of the controls of the War Production Board.
. The time element is covered. There can be no damages for failure
to perform at the time specified in the contract. But the parties to the
contract must still look to· cases like the Metropolitan Water case to
determine whether either one may insist on performance after the
emergency has passed.82
•
In that connection, it is interesting to note that the War Production
Board in informal correspondence expressed the opinion in I 942 that
a cancellation of priorities destroyed the contract, but that a mere suspension of priorities did not have that effect. Twelve months later,
however, it expressed the opinion that the same effect followed even
from its suspension orders made a year previously. Perhaps the board
unconsciously leaned toward the view that a suspension of one year or
more had caused such an "inordinate ppstponement" as mentioned in
the W eidner38 case.
One is led to inquire whether theMetropolitan Water case and all
other cases of frustration could have been based upon the destruction of
the time element rather than upon the failure of an intangible, indefinhis property without due process? Stated differently, is this statute valid if it is not
declaratory of the law of the state of the contract?
The "No damage" statute was clarified in 1942 by Pub. L. 507, 77th Cong., 2d
sess. (March 27, 1942), 56 Stat. L. 176.
·
81
6 FED. REG. 4490, tit. 32, c. IX, sub-section 13, § 994.13 (August 30, 1941).
82 Of course, when the time element is destroyed the contract is ordinarily destroyed as time is usually of the essence of the .contract, particularly when !he contract
expressly so provides or the circumstances indicate that to be the intention of the parties;
Skolnick v. South, 287 Ill. App 627 (1936); Primos Chemical Co. v. Fulton Steel
Corp., (D.C.N.Y. 1920) 266 F. 945. When time is not of the essence or there has
been a waiver, it may be made of the essence by notice requiring performance within a
specified reasonable time; Mawhinney v. Millbrook Woolen Mills, Inc., 231 N.Y. 290,
132 N.E. 93 (1921). See 15 A.L.R. 1506, 1512 (1921) and 12 Am. Jur. § 310,
p. 865 (1938).
38
[ 1916] I K.B. 429.

1 944}

WAR AND PRIVATE-CONTRACTS

able "implied condition." True, in the main case the purchaser, who is
generally the one most interested in the time of performance, was
seeking the perpetuation of the contract, but a seller may have a like
interest in the time element. It may be extremely expensive for him to
perform at some indefinite date in the future. An aggregate reading of
all the cases impresses one with the constant intrusion of the time element. It should not be surprising if the doctrine eventually finds its
resting place upon that foundation.
The Metropolitan Water Board case obviously has become deeply
imbedded in American jurisprudence. One who studies that case and
then the American cases is impressed by the laborious care with which
the House of Lords sought to express the rationale of the doctrine as
well as by the nonchalant ease with which it was imported into our law.
Be that as it may, there can be little doubt that the doctrine of "commercial frustration," fortified now by the "no damage" statute, has
become a permanent part of American law.

II.
WHO BEARS THE Loss?
On the second subject of inquiry: who bears the loss in case of
frustration, the Fibrosa case s4, will be as important in its influence upon
the courts as the Metropolitan Water Board case has proved to be.
But the Fibrosa case will leave many questions unanswered because by
its facts and the terms of the opinions of the Lords it is limited to cases
of total failure of consideration.
Variations in facts have arisen and will continue to arise and may in
part be summarized into the following classifications:
I. Cases in which there is a total failure of consideration, although
the contractor had been put to expense in preparing for performance, as
in the Fibrosa case.
2. Cases in which the contract is divisible and one or more completed units have been delivered.
M Fibrosa Spoka Akeyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd., 167 L.T.R.
(H.L.) 101 (1942). See 144 A.L.R. 1298, 1317 (1943).
One of the first American war cases to follow the doctrine applied in the Fibrosa
Case is Cinquegrano v. T. A. Clarke Motors, (R.I. 1943) 30 A. (2d) 859, in which a
buyer who had made a payment on account of the purchase of a new motor car which
could not be delivered because of priority restrictions was allowed to recover his payment
from the seller. It is not particularly helpful as the seller suffered no loss from the destruction of the contract. See Swift v. Hale Pontiac Sales, 34 N.Y.S. (2d) 888 (1942).
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3. Cases in which the contract is not divisible, but there has been a
partial performance ( a) by delivery of articles which have utility to
the purchaser or are salable on a general market; (b) by delivery of
articles which have no utility except as inseparable parts of -the com- pleted machine or structure.
4. Cases involving a sub-contractor who has (a) completed his
work, or (b) partially completed it.
5. Those involving work done in improving or repairing existing
machines or structures, title of which is in the purchaser.85
~

I.

The Fibrosa case is a complete answer, at least for British jurisdictions, in the first class of cases. A Polish company had -contracted
with a manufacturer in Leeds whereby the latter agreed to supply certain machines for forty-eight hu~dred pounds; one-third was to be ,
paid with the order and the balance against shipping doc1:1ments. The
contract was dated July I2,-I939; delivery was to be at Gydnia,Poland,
three or four months after settlement of final details. Six days after the
contract, the Polish company paid one thousand pounds toward the
initial payment of sixteen hundred poun~s due. On September I, I939,
Germany invaded Poland and on September 3 Great Britain declared
war on Germany. On September 23 Poland was declared eneniy territory. Performance qf the contract became both impossible and illegal.
'fhe machines were never shipped. The Polish company demanded re, payment of the thousand pounds; Recovery was allowed on the theory
that the contract having been frustrated, both parties were excused from
further performance, and that since the defendant had received money
from the plaintiff, who had received nothing in return, the defendant
had been unjustly enriched and plaintiff was entitled to a quasi contractual recovery. The rule was stated by Lord Wright to be "on the
simple theory that a man, who has paid in advance for something which
he has never got, ought to have his .money back."
The case specifically overruled Chandler v. Webster, 86 which was
one of the coronation cases. There the owner of a building had let cer35 These classifications do not cover the entire field. For an additional type see
The San Guiseppe, (C.C.A. 4th, 1941) i22 F. (2d) 579. There a vessel which put in
at Norfolk on account of war was held excused ·from its contract to carry to London,
but was held responsible for the cost of unloading.
86
[1904] l K.B. 493, 90 L.T.R. 217 (1904). The doctrine so overruled is said
to have had its origin in Blakeley v. Muller, [1903] 2 K.B. 760 at 762, 88 L.T.R. 90
at 92 (1903), but took its name from the Chandler case.
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tain rooms overlooking a public street to be sublet by the lessee for use
by spectators in viewing the coronation parade of Edward VII. The
contract provided for a certain down payment and the balance on the
day of the coronation. Prior to that day His Majesty (being but human flesh) contracted a cold 'which necessitated cancellation of the
parade. It was held that "the loss lies where it falls" with the result
that the sums paid or rights accrued before the event of frustration
were not to be surrendered, but all obligations falling due for performance after the event were discharged.87
Under that principle the lessor was entitled to retain the amounts
paid or that were due prior to the frustration and such sums could not
be recovered by the lessee. That prip.ciple had been applied in a number of cases in the lower courts of England, but had never been
reviewed by the House of Lords. The Fibrosa case was the first consideration of the principle by that body. Chandler v. Webster was overruled.
Lord Wright observed that the Chandler case had been criticized
by Williston and had not been followed in most of the states in
America, a comment believed amply supported by American authorities.
The Fibrosa doctrine, as observed, works a "rough justice." 88 It
87
In Dougherty Co. v. 2471 Tons of Coal, (D.C. Mass. 1922) 278 F. 799, the
owner sued the charterer of a vessel for demurrage. Part of the delay had been caused
by governmental action. The court said at p. 801:
" ... Government control of business is very apt to cause heavy losses to persons
engaged in the business controlled. That was so in this instance; there is a large out of
pocket loss, which somebody must bear. Generally speaking, losses caused by government interference with the performance of contracts are left where they fall; they are
not to be transferred from one person to another, unless the latter has contracted to take
the risk of them, or is otherwise obliged to do so. The Juno, (1916) L. R. Prob. Div.
169; Met. Water Board v. Dick, [1918] App. Cas. II9."
This case in terms would seem to support Chandler v. Webster, but upon its
facts it could have been decided the same way under the rule of the Fibrosa case.
88
An amplification of the difficulties of the doctrine was made by Lord Wright in
Fibrosa Spolka Akeyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd., 167 L.T.R. (H.L.)
(1942) IOI at 113 (1942) in these words:
" .•• But I think it is clear both in England and Scots law that the failure of consideration which justifies repayment is a failure in the contract performance. What is
meant is not consideration in the sense in which the word is used when it is said that in
executory contracts the promise of one party is consideration for the promise of the
other. No doubt in some cases the recipient of the payment may be exposed to hardship
if he has to return the money though before the frustration he has incurred the bulk
of the expense and is then left with things on his hands which become valueless to
him when the contract fails, so that he gets nothing and has to return the prepayment.
These and many other difficulties show that the English rule of recovering payment the
consideration for which has failed works a rough justice. It was adopted in more primi-
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cannot, nor could any other doctrine, do such justice as would satisfy
both parties. Th,e seller who may have been put to large outlays in
preparing for performance loses his expenditures. The suggestion
sometimes made that he should be entitled to recover on quasi contractual principles has no basis in reason. Recovery should be based upon
unjust enrichment of the other party, (which has not occurred in these
situations). It should not be extended to cases of unfortunate impoverishment. If the buyer were charged with any part of those expenses, he would be obliged to pay for something he has never received.
This would be true even if there were an apportionment between them.
It might be argued that the seller would not have embarked upon
his expenditures excepting on the faith of the co!ltract to which he was
induced to become a party by the purchaser. The answer is that the
purchaser did not contract for an uncompleted thing, but for a certain
· result of which he has received no part, and consequently ,has obtained
neither benefit nor enrichment. The amount expended toward performance is a casualty of war. In that sense the loss lies where it falls.
The Fibrosa case has been criticized 39 for permitting the recovery
of the entire amount paid by the purchaser: it is argued that the seller
has been unjustly enriched only to the extent of the money received by
him less his expenditures. That argument makes the result dependent
upon the incidental circumstance of prepayment. Suppose ·there had
tive times and was based on the simple th~ory that a man who has paid in advance for
something which he has never got ought to have his money back. It is further imperfect because it depends on an entire consideration and a total failure. Courts of equity
have evolved a fairer method of apportioning an entire considerati~n in cases where a
premium has been paid for a partnership which has been ended before its time {Partnership Act, sect. 40), contrary to the Common Law. rule laid down in W hincup u.
Hughes [{1871) 24 L.T.R. 76; L.R. 6 C.P. 78]. Some day the Legislature may intervene to remedy these defects."
In the Whincup case, L.R. 6 C.P. 78 at 81 {1871), Bovill, C. J., states.the common law rule as follows:
·
" ••• The general rule of the law is, that where a contract has been in part performed no part of the money paid under such contract can be recovered back. There
may be some cases of partial performance which form exceptions to this rule•••• But
there the consideration is clearly severable."
'
It is further pointed out in the case that under the common law, an action for
money had and received would lie where there was a total failure of consideration.
In addition to the jurisdiction conferred upon courts of equity of partnership cases
under the Partnership Act mentioned by Lord Wright which permits apportionment of
an entire consideration when a partnership is dissolved, there is some authority to indicate that courts of equity do have general jurisdiction different from the common· law
rule. In the Whincup case, two equity cases are cited as authorities; Scam v. Bowden,
Finch's Rep. 396; Newton v. Rowse, 1 V~rn. 460.
39
144 A.L.R. 1325 (1943).
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been no prepayment? On what theory could the seller recover? There
has been no enrichment of the vendee. There has been only an unfortunate impoverishment of the seller. The latter's claim for redress
must stand on its own bottom, not upon the incident of whether partial
prepayment has been made.
Before passing, we must note that the Fibrosa case permitted the
rule of the Chandler case to stand when applied to prepayment of
freight in carriage by ship. That exception was said to be based upon an
implied understanding arising from the custom of the trade. The Supreme Court of the United States applied the same rule to freight 40
but based it upon the terms of the bill of lading which, in effect, expressed the implied understanding referred to by the House of Lords.
The principle followed in the Fibrosa case had frequently been applied in the United States in cases involving total failure of consideration. But in some the element of expense incurred by the seller was
absent. Of that type are those that deal with the sale of lands or chattels
on which a prepayment had been made by the buyer but in which transfer of title later proved to be impossible. Recovery of the amount paid
by the buyer has generally been allowed. 41 "One who has paid for
goods which he never gets is entitled to recover the payment, even
though the reason why performance is not made by the seJler is excusable impossibility." 42
But we are principally concerned with cases in which the seller has
been put to expense, as that circumstance is present in the vast majority
of contracts which have felt the impingement of the orders of the
WPB or OPA. While we find a rapidly multiplying number of cases
dealing with frustration by war orders, the number dealing with the
burden of the loss is to date meager. A close parallel exists between the
burden of loss problem in war frustration cases and the fire cases in
which a contractor (seller) has agreed to erect a building upon the land
of the owner (buyer), has partially completed the structure, when it is
40
Allanwilde Transport Corp. v. Vacuum Oil Co., 248 U.S. 377, 39 S. Ct. 147
(1919). See 3 A.L.R. 15, 21 (1919).
41
VonWaldheim v. Englewood Heights Estates, II5 N.J.L. 220, 179 A. 19
(1935); Watson v. Donald, 142 Ill. App. II0 (1908); Kares v. Covell, 180 Mass.
206, 62 N.E. 244 (1902); Ogren v. Inner Harbor Land Co., 83 Cal. App. 197, 256
P. 607 (1927); Potts Drug Co. v. Benedict, 156 Cal. 322, 104 P. 432 (1909);
Erdreich v. Zimmerman, 107 Misc. 508, 176 N.Y.S. 762 (1919). See the automobile
purchase cases in note 34, supra.
42
6 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS, rev. ed.,§ 1974, p. 5545, note 3 (1938). See dictum in Primos Chemical Co. v. Fulton Steel Corp., (D.C.N.Y. 1920) 266 F. 945.
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destroyed by fire. May the contractor recover for what he has done, or,
conversely, may the owner recover back any prepayments he has made?
The rule in those cases is consistent with the doctrine of the Fibrosa
case. If the contract is to erect and build an entire structure, the contract
being indivisible, the contractor bears the entire loss. 43
Under those circums~ances the contractor cannot recover for work
performed or material furnished before the destruction of the contract. 44
In case·partial' payments have been made they may be recovered
back if the contractor refuses to rebuild.45 The same rules have been
applied whether the fire was caused accidentally or by an act of God,
such as lightning, violent storms or other disturbances of nature.46 "The
act of God _may properly lift from. his shoulders the burden of performance, but has not yet been extended so as to enable him to keep the
other man's property for nothing." 47
Many apparent parallels between those cases and the· cases typified
43

Tompkins v. Dudley, 25 N.Y. 272 (1862); Schwartz v. Saunders, 46 Ill. 18
{1867); School Trustees
Bennett, 3 Dutcher (27 N.J.L.) 513 (1859); Siegel v.
Eaton and Prince Co., 165 Ill. 550, 46 N.E. 499 {1897); Huyett & Smith Co. v.
Edison Co., 167 Ill. 233, 47 N.E. 384 {1897); Quaker Mfg. Co:v. Zucker, 124 Ill.
App.· 547 (1906); Keeling v. Sc_hastey & Vollmer, 18 Cal. App. 764, 124 P. 445
(1912); Tulsa Opera House Co. v. Mitchell, 165 Okla. 61, 24 P. {2d) 997 (1933);
Milske v. Steiner Mantel Co., 103 Md. 235, 63 A. 471 (1906); Fildew v. Besley, 42
Mich. 100, 3 N.W. 278 (1879); Gabler v. Evans Laboratories, 129 Misc. 911, 223
N.Y.S. 408 (1927); Vogt v. Hecker, 118 Wis. -306, 95 N.W. 90 (1903); Bogar &
Son Co. v. Zug, 48 Dauphin Co. (Pa.) 178 (1940); U.S.F. & G. Co. v. Parsons, 147
Miss. 335, 112 So. 469 (1927), annotations in 53 A.L.R. 88 (1928).
44
Peck-Hammond & Co. v. Miller, 164 Ky. 206, 175 S.W. 347 (1915); Adams
v. Nichols, 19 Pick. (36 Mass.) 275 (1837); Fildew v. Besley, 42 Mich. 100, 3
N.W. 278 (1897); Public Schools v. Bennett, 3 Dutcher (27 N.J.L.) 513 (1859);
Eaton v. Joint School Dist., 23 Wis. 374 (1868); Vogt v. Hecker, 118 Wis. 306, 95
N.W. 90 (1903); Siegel v. Eaton & Prince Co., 165 Ill. 550, 46 N.E. 449 (1897);
Huyett & Smith Co. v. Edison Co., 167 Ill. 233, 47 N.E. 384 (1897); Keeling v.
Schastey & Vollmer, 18 Cal. App. 764, 124 P. 445 (:1912).
45
U.S. F. & G. Co. v. Parsons, 147 Miss. 335, 112 So. 469 (1927) with annotations in 53 A.L.R. 88 (1928); Doll v. Young, 149 Ky. 347, 149 S.W. 854 (1912);
Stees v. Leonard,- 20 Minn. 448 (1874); Keel v. East Carolina Stone & c;onstr. Co.,
143 N.C. 429, 55 S.E. 826 (1906). ,
46
United States v. Lewis, (C.C.A. 8th, 1916) 237 F. So; School Dist. v. Danehy,
25 Conn. 530 (1857); Doll v. Young, 149 Ky. 347, 149 S.W. 854 (1912); Public
Schools v. Bennett, 3 Dutcher (27 N.J.L.) 513 (1859); Vogt v. Hecker, 118 Wis.
306, 95 N.W. 90 (1903); Krause v. Crothersville, 162 Ind. 278, 70 N.E. 264 (1904)
with annotations in 65 L.R.A. 11_1 (1904) .
47
•
Board of Education v. Townsend, 63 Ohio St. 514 at 524, 59 N.E. 223
(1900). See 52 L.R.A. 868 (1901). See also Bell v. Kanawha Traction & E. Co.,
83 W. Va. 640, 98 S.E. 885 (1919); Lamb v. Cal. Water & Tel. Co., (Cal. 1942)
129 P. (2d) 371.
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by the Fibrosa case suggest themselves. In both the contractor (seller)
has incurred expense in preparing for performance; in both the con, summation of the contract has been frustrated by events beyond the
control of either party; in both the buyer has received no benefits. The
parallels are such as to make quite possible an application of the rule
of the fire cases to situations arising from the frustration of contracts due
to the exigencies of war.
The rule is, however, a harsh one. It falls heavily upon the seller
who in the war cases has not been able to protect himself with insurance
as a contractor in the fire cases is able to do when he has knowledge of
the applicable law.
This severity will undoubtedly cause the courts to seek -circumstances to soften its effects and_ to cause a distribution of the Joss upon
some defensible basis. This has occurred in the fire cases.
2.

One method of relief is to hold the contract divisible. A contract
for placing an elevator in a building provided for one-half payment
when the engine was on the foundation, and final payment on, completion of the work. The building was destroyed after the engine was on
the foundation. The contract was held severable. The contractor was
permitted to recover for the engine, but not for the work he had done
toward the completion of the remainder of the job.48
In another case a contract for an installation of a sprinkler provided
that one-third of the purch;:i,se price was to be paid wheri enough material was shipped to begin the work, one-third when the work was
substantially completed, and the balance thirty days thereafter. When
enough material was shipped to begin the work, and it was paid for,
the house burned down. It was held that the buyer could not recover
the installment paid. The court said:
"'If installments are to become due and payable absolutely on
the performance of a certain proportion of the work, each of such
installments is due and payable when such part or proportion specified is completed, and the subsequent accidental destruction of the
structure does not relieve the owner from his obligation to pay
such installments.'" 49
That rule has been applied in a number of cases.Go
48

Siegel v. Eaton & Prince Co., 165 Ill. 550, 46 N.E. 449 (1897).
Greenfield v. Globe Automatic Sprinkler Co., (C.C.A. 5th, 1922) 285 F. 27 at
28. See Peck-Hammond & Co. v. Miller, 164 Ky. 206, 175 S.W. 347 (1915).
Go Anderson v. Quick, 163 Cal. 658, 126 P. 871 (1912); Richardson v. Shaw, 1
49
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It is not our purpose to discuss the principles defining indivisible
or severable contracts, but only to point out that this construction of a
contract affords an escape from what at times may prove to be a burdensome application of the rule of the Fibrosa case.

3.
Many situations have arisen in which the contract was unquestionably indivisible but part of the materials necessary for performance had
been delivered to the seller. This was the situation in innumerable
cases that felt the impact of the order of the WPB in I 942. Those
cases fall into two divisions: first, where the materials delivered have
general utility to the purchaser or are salable on the open market. Few
war cases discussing that precise question seem to be available but the
application of the unjust enrichment rules of the Fibrosa case would
seem to dictate that in such instances the purchaser should be liable
for the fair market value of the materials that 'he has received and
which are usable by him. There is in such instances an actual enrichment of the purchaser and not merely an incidental impoverishment of
the seller. No doubt can be entertained that in those cases courts would
permit recovery f<;>r the fair value of such materials~ A recovery of that
kind was allowed, without discussion of the principle, in the Roxford
Knitting case, discussed above. 51
The second are thos,e in which the material delivered has value only
as an inseparable part of the completed machine or structure. If such a
part had been delivered in t;he Fibrosa case, it is not believed that the
result would have been different. The buyer has received no advantage
or enrichment and has on ·his hands merely a piece which is as useless
as junk. If, however, the part delivered would have utility as a replacement or spare part in machines being operated by the purchaser or
others, the case would fall under the preceding paragraph. 52

•

Mo. App. 234 (1876); Keel v. East Carolina Stone & Constr. Co., 143 N.C. 429, 55
S.E. 826 (1906); note Ann. Cas. 1913A, 458.
51
6 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs, rev. ed., § 1759, 1f 1, p. 4996 (1938):
"If any legal part of the contract has been performed, recovery of the value of
the part performance may be had on a quantum meruit count, whether the supervening
illegality prevents the defendant ·from receiving further performance or prevents the
plaintiff from rendering it."
It is perhaps more accurate to state that recovery is allowable for the value of the
benefit derived from part performance.
52
2 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 468, p. 884 (1932) states what Lord Wright
in the Fibrosa case 167 L.T.R. (H.L.) IOI at II2 considers the American law to be:
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4.
There are also the cases of the sub-contractors who contribute only
a part of the labor or materials, or both, toward the erection of a building while the owner himself, or other contractors construct the other
parts. The tendency appears to be to hold that the sub-contractor may
recover for what he has done. 58 In those cases the rule seems to be that
the continued existence of the building is an implied condition of the
contract, that upon its destruction both are excused from further performance, but that since the contractor did not agree to complete an entire building he may recover for what he has done even though he did
not complete his work. If, however, he is a contractor who agrees to
supply a distinct and separate part of the structure, such as an elevator
or ventilating system, and his contract is an indivisible one, the doctrine of the Fibrosa case applies. 54

5.
The price of work done in improving or repairing existing machines
or structures, the title of which is in the purchaser, can be recovered
even though the subject matter is destroyed before completion of the
" ..• the law of the United States seems to go beyond the mere remedy of claims
for money had and received and allows the recovery of the value of the benefit of any
part performance rendered while performance was possible."
The quotation from the RESTATEMENT is as follows:
"Sec. 468-Rights of Restitution.
" (I) Except where a contract clearly provides otherwise, a party thereto who has
rendered part performance for which there is no defined return performance fixed by
the contract, and who is discharged from the duty of further performance by impossibility of rendering it, can get judgment for the value of the part performance rendered,
unless it can be and is returned to him in specie within a reasonable time.
"(2) Except where a contract clearly provides otherwise, a party thereto who has
rendered performance for which the other party is excused by impossibility from rendering the agreed exchange, can get judgment for the value of what he has rendered, less
the value of what he has received, unless what he has rendered can be and is returned to
him in specie within a reasonable time.
"(3) The value of performance within the meaning of Subsections (1, 2) is the
benefit derived from the performance in advancing the object of the contract, not exceeding, however, a ratable portion of the contract price."
These rules squarely are based upon quasi-contractual unjust enrichment and not
unfortunate impoverishment. The definition of value seems to be "market value,"
never in excess of contract value. The still knotty problem of determining value in the
absence of "market value" is left to the discretion of the court.
58
Swartz v. Saunders, 46 Ill. 18 (1867); Clark v. Busse, 82 Ill. 515 (1876);
Rawson v. Clark, 70 Ill. 656 (1873); Cook v. McCabe, 53 Wis. 250, 10 N.W. 507
(1881); Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass. 517, 27 N.E. 667 (1891); Gabler v. Evans
Laboratories, 129 Misc. 9u, 223 N.Y.S. 408 (1927).
54
Huyett & Smith Co. v. Edison Co., 167 Ill. 233, 47 N.E. 384 (1897); Louisville Foundry and Machine Co. v. Patterson, 29 Ky. L. 349, 93 S.W. 22 (1906).
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work. This rule seems 'to proceed sometimes upon the principle that the
continued existence is a condition to the performance but more truly
upon the doctrine that title to the parts completed vests in the purchaser moment by moment as the work progresses. 55
The coming years will doubtl~s bring forth many cases in develop. ment of the doctrine which :finds its first expression in the Fibrosa case.
There have been incidental answer~ in some of the cases. In the Roxford Knitting case the seller was permitted to recover for the materials
that he had delivered. This supports the principle stated in division 3
above. In the lease cases the entire loss falls upon the landlord. Those
cases seem to fall in the first classification of which the Fibrosa case is
the leading authority.
When the courts consider the war cases, with their many varying
circumstances, it is not unlikely that they_will find a convenient parallel
in the fire cases, which begin basically with the doctrine expressed in
the Fibrosa case. The exceptions and qualifications couJd, with some
logic, be applied to the divers situations that will arise in cases of frustration ·through war orders.
·
All of the rules which have been discuss'ed are subject to any express
provision in the contract directing where the loss shall fall. After our
entry into the war and before the government had so thoroughly oc:..
cupied the industrial field, many of the contracts expressly provided for
the contingency of prohibition of the work. An ordinary provision was
that the seller should be compensated for what he expended-some
. eliminated his element of profit. Such contractual provisions prevail
over any of the rules that have been discussed. 56
The burden of developing a body of common law to meet the contract damage problems now being created by the war might be removed from the courts by the enactment of legislation, both federal and
state. However, unless such legislation is drawn with the most extreme
care, it could create more problems than it would solve. It seems unlikely that a statute could meet the situation as well as an application of
the principles which have been discussed.
.
55
Angus v. Scully, 176 Mass. 357, 57 N.E. '674 (1900) with annotations in 49
L.R.A. 562 (1900); Goldfarb v. Cohen, 92 Conn. 277, 102 A. 649 (1917); Carroll
v. Bowersock, 100 Kan. 270, 164 P. 143 (1917); Ganong v. Brown, 88 Miss. 53, 40
So. 556 (1906); Halsey v. Waukesha Springs Sanitarium Co., 125·Wis. 311, 104 N.W.
94 (1905); Krause v. Crothersville, 162 Ind. 278, 70 N.E. 264 (1904).
56
American Union Line v. Orii,ntal Nav. Corp., 239 N.Y. 207, 147 N.E. 227
(1924); Mosser Co. v. Cherry River Co., 290 Pa. 67, 138 A. 85 (1927).
·

